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The New Business Rule and Compensation for Lost Profits 
 
Victor Goldberg 
 
In the late 1960’s, the movers and shakers of Buffalo determined that their 
football team, the Bills, needed a new domed stadium. The County entered into a contract 
with Kenford, a firm owned by a local landowner, Ed Cottrell, who teamed up with Judge 
Roy Hofheinz (the creator and operator of the Houston Astrodome, the first domed 
stadium). They would provide the land for the stadium in exchange for a management 
contract. They also owned the adjacent land and intended to develop it after the stadium 
was built. The expected cost of the stadium was $50 million; however, when the 
construction bids came in, the low bid was $72 million. That was too much for the 
County, so it cancelled its plan to build the stadium, whereupon Kenford sued for breach 
of contract. Kenford won on liability and the damage issue went to trial—a very long 
(nine-month) trial.
1
 Kenford hired a team of economic experts to determine damages. 
Had the stadium been built, it argued, it would have developed the peripheral land with a 
theme park, three hotels, four office buildings, a golf course, and a specialty retail center. 
The team of experts spent months testifying giving their projections of future costs and 
revenues on a year-by-year basis for twenty years, concluding that the lost profits from 
this component of damages alone was over $380 million. Total claims exceeded $500 
million.
2
  When the dust had cleared, Kenford received $10 million, none of that for those 
lost profits.
3
 
 
As a matter of sound policy the denial was correct, although the trial judge got 
there with a dubious argument, which I need not reproduce here.
4
 Kenford’s lost profit 
claim faced a doctrinal hurdle—the so-called new business rule. If a business did not 
have a history of profitable operations, it would have been denied recovery for lost profits. 
Not so long ago, most American jurisdictions followed this per se rule. That has changed. 
In his treatise, Robert Dunn summarized the change: “The first edition of this book 
described the new-business rule as a ‘majority rule’ and the rejection of the new-business 
rule as a ‘minority rule.’ The trend in the cases since 1978 is unmistakable. The modern 
decisions … demonstrate an increased rejection of the traditional new business rule. The 
majority and minority rules are now the other way around.”5 Likewise, Farnsworth stated 
that the rule “has been largely abandoned.”6 The per se rule still exists in some 
jurisdictions, notably New York (although, as we shall see, the New York courts have 
tied themselves up in knots in an effort to apply the per se rule). 
 
                                                 
1
 The litigation dragged on for eighteen years. For details, see Goldberg, Rethinking Contract Law and 
Contract Design, ch. 9. 
2
 They also argued that if the stadium had been built they would have been able to entice a major league 
baseball team (possibly the New York Yankees) to come. The expert opined that the lost profits arising 
from the failure to buy the Yankees was $146 million. 
3
 Kenford Company v. Erie County 73 N.Y. 2d 312 (1989). 
4
 For details see Rethinking 102-3. 
5 Robert Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits, § 4.3 at 391. 
6 Farnsworth treatise, § 12.15 at 272. 
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The prevailing wisdom nowadays accepts Dunn’s notion that a new business is no 
different than an existing one. “What the earlier cases perceived as a rule of law has been 
replaced in the cases cited by a rule of evidence. The rule of evidence is far preferable. . . . 
The trend in the modern cases is plainly toward replacing the old rule of law with a rule 
of evidence—the unquestionable principle that damages for loss of profits must be 
proven with reasonable certainty.”7  
 
However, I want to argue, the prevailing wisdom is wrong. The damages for a 
new business ought not be viewed as merely a matter of whether the evidence is 
sufficient to surmount the “reasonable certainty” hurdle. By not appreciating the 
underlying economics, the courts have lumped together a disparate set of problems under 
the new business rubric and attempted to treat them all alike. For some, like the Kenford 
claimants, I would argue, the zero compensation result would be appropriate; for others 
not. Unpacking the concept results in a more nuanced approach to measuring damages. In 
particular, it calls into question a common refrain in contracts discourse, namely, that the 
damage rules result in systematic undercompensation.
8
  I will argue that the increased 
liberality in awarding lost profits to new businesses has, in many instances resulted in 
overcompensation. All the errors are not, however, in one direction; in other contexts 
application of the rule has (or would have) resulted in undercompensation.  
 
To get a better handle on this, I will break down the case law into four categories. 
These are stylized in that actual cases might not fit completely within a single box. There 
is a class of cases in which the appropriate new business award is zero, but the courts 
have drawn the line in the wrong place. The crucial issue is not the lack of a track record 
or whether damages can be proved with “reasonable certainty”; rather the focus should be 
on the expected return on a new investment (whether by a new or existing business). 
These cases can be characterized by Terry Malloy’s plaintive cry: “I could’ve been a 
contender.”9 Following a breach, the plaintiff, who has done nothing in reliance, claims 
that, but for the breach, I would have done X and I would have made a lot of money by 
doing so. As one court said: “Most contracts are motivated by the expectation of future 
profits. If such profits are within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract 
is made, they may form the measure of damage.”10 Why then should the plaintiff not be 
compensated? The simple answer is that the damage remedy has to take account of the 
opportunity cost of capital. Since there is no reason to believe that this particular 
investment would have been more profitable than any alternative use of the funds that the 
plaintiff saved because the deal cratered, there would be no loss. Thus, returning to the 
                                                 
7 Dunn, § 4.3 at 392.  “[T]he distinction between established businesses and new ones …goes to the weight 
of the evidence.” Dobbs. __. 
8 Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271, 275-76 (1979); Steven Shavell, Is 
Breach of Contract Immoral? 56 Emory L.J. 439, 451 (2006); Douglas G. Baird, The Young Astronomers, 
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1641, 1650 (2007); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 
Cal. L. Rev. 563, 610-11 (1992); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 
Vand. L. Rev. 1003, 1006 (2010); David W. Carroll, A Little Essay in Partial Defense of the Contract-
Market Differential As A Remedy for Buyers, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 667, 680-81 (1984). 
9 Terry Malloy (aka Marlon Brando), On the Waterfront. 
10 Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 15, 390 P.2d 677, 686 adhered to sub nom. Larsen v. 
Walton Plywood Co., 65 Wash. 2d 1, 396 P.2d 879 (1964). 
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domed stadium that wasn’t, Kenford still had the funds it would have invested in the 
hotels, golf course, and other projects. It could have invested the funds in other projects 
and there was no reason to believe that one set of projects was better or worse than the 
other.
11
 This argument will be developed (and qualified) in Section I. 
In the second category of cases, the owner of some intellectual property licenses it 
to a party who fails to exploit it. Suppose that part of the licensor’s compensation was 
contingent, perhaps in the form of a royalty, and the licensor proved that the licensee 
breached by failing to exploit the property. The damages would be the royalties on the 
projected sales. Unlike in the first case, the licensor has already made its investment. 
Unless the contract has a liquidated damages clause or some other restriction on recovery 
(and contracts often do) the damages should be recoverable. As we shall see below, the 
New York per se rule against awarding lost profits for new businesses has conflated these 
cases with the first category resulting in some very convoluted reasoning. These cases, 
and their interplay with the other categories, will be analyzed in Section II. 
Third, the promisor could have delayed performance or provided a defective 
product. Perhaps a construction project comes on line a few months late, a delivery 
arrives late, or the seller breaches a warranty. In these cases, performance eventually does 
take place. This category puts us squarely in the Hadley v. Baxendale world. Depending 
on the facts, one could make a strong case for outcomes ranging from no compensation to 
expectation damages.
12
 This class of case will be analyzed in Section III. 
 
Finally, I will consider the buyer’s anticipatory repudiation of a long-term 
contract in which the seller has partially performed. The seller’s ability to recover lost 
profits should, I will argue, depend on neither the newness of the business nor the 
reasonable certainty of the damage calculations. If there had been no change in market 
conditions there should be no recovery for lost profits. If market conditions had changed, 
lost profits should be recoverable. However, the recovery should be for direct, not 
consequential, damages. In Section IV, I will elaborate on why that makes a difference. 
 
The “new business rule,” therefore, should not be thought of as a single rule. By 
stuffing these different types of problems into a single box, courts and commentators 
undermined the rationale for the rule, even for those cases in which the rule made sense. 
The courts have deployed some devices on an ad hoc basis—notably “reasonable 
                                                 
11
 The two principals were highly leveraged so that their future spending would most likely have been 
funded by debt. The principals did own, or have options on, adjacent land. As I note in the next section, 
owning a complementary asset can make the investment more valuable than alternatives. However, the 
value of the new structures would have been reflected in the land value. The experts also claimed the 
potential appreciation in value of that land as a separate source of damages; including both would have 
been double counting. In the end, the Court of Appeals denied recovery for the lost land value appreciation 
as well; see Kenford Co., Inc. v. Erie Cnty., 73 N.Y. 2d 312 (1989). 
12 Judge Posner recognized this in his decision in Mindgames v. Western Publishing Co. 218 F.3d 652, 
655. “The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), often prevents the victim of a 
breach of contract from obtaining lost profits, but that rule is not invoked here. Neither the ‘new business’ 
rule nor the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale stands for the general proposition that lost profits are never a 
recoverable item of damages in a tort or breach of contract case.” 
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certainty” determining whether the claimant’s business is truly new—as wild cards to 
justify awarding damages to some plaintiffs but not others.  
 
I. Opportunity Cost 
  
Suppose that when the promisor breached a contract the promisee had done nothing at 
all in reliance. The promisee then claims that, but for the breach, it would have done 
something that would have been profitable and it has lost the profits from that activity. 
Suppose further that the promisee has no complementary assets that would have made 
this activity uniquely valuable. At the time of the breach it had not yet invested any 
money, but it was going to do so and, it claims, it would have been successful. It would 
then bring in expert witnesses who would testify as to how much would have been earned. 
These foregone earnings for these  “stillborn enterprises” would be the “lost profits.”13  
 
The relevant question should not be whether the project would make money but 
whether it would make more money than the next best alternative. The investment might 
have turned out to be wildly successful or a dismal failure, but there is no a priori reason 
to believe that the expected rate of return would exceed the going market rate. After the 
breach the promisee still has the money that it would otherwise have invested in the 
project and it would be free to do anything it wants with those funds. The expected value 
of the specific project would be the same as the market rate, so the promisee’s loss would 
be zero. I need not qualify this by comparing the riskiness of the particular project with 
the market rate since the opportunity cost of the funds takes the relative riskiness into 
account.  For this class of cases the per se rule—no compensation—makes sense. 
 
By not recognizing this simple point, the courts have allowed plaintiffs, like Kenford, 
to introduce evidence of losses that would substantially overcompensate them. Since the 
damage claims are usually treated as questions of fact, not law, the courts, with no 
coherent theory to deal with the claims, allow many of them to succeed, or at least to get 
to the jury. Even if the claims would ultimately be denied they could have significant 
effects. They raise the costs of litigation if expert testimony can be given to prove the 
alleged loss.
14
 In the Kenford litigation hundreds of thousands of dollars (millions today, 
adjusted for inflation) and months of juror’s time were wasted by expert witness 
                                                 
13 The term is from Roger I. Abrams Donald Welsch Bruce Jonas, “Stillborn Enterprises: Calculating 
Expectation Damages Using Forensic Economics,” 57 Ohio St. L.J. 809. 
14 In an antitrust case Judge Posner disparaged the damage claims by the expert witness: 
The projection of lost profits that Olympia’s expert witness made to the jury bore no 
relation to Olympia’s internal business planning or to economic reality. . . . It is thus one 
more illustration of the old problem of expert witnesses who are “often the mere paid 
advocates or partisans of those who employ and pay them, as much so as the attorneys 
who conduct the suit. There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that 
cannot now be proved by some so-called ‘experts.’ ” . . . The expert in this case dazzled 
the jury with “an array of figures conveying a delusive impression of exactness,”—
delusive because the figures had no relation to reality. (Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370 (1986)). 
Of course, not all expert witnesses behave this way; I am occasionally in that role and I hope that I am 
objective. Nonetheless, as we shall see in some of the cases discussed below, the experts do often engage in 
stretching the truth. 
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testimony. In addition, uncertainty over whether a court (trial or appeal) would accept the 
evidence would affect the settlement value.
15
 In the remainder of this subsection, I will 
provide some examples from the case law of attempts by plaintiffs to assert lost profit 
claims for stillborn projects.  
 
1. Fera v. Village Plaza16 
 
The case appears in a number of casebooks and is oft-cited by other courts as an 
illustration of a modern court recognizing the lost profits of a business that had not yet 
begun to operate.
17
 Fera intended to open a “book and bottle” shop18 and executed a ten-
year lease. For reasons unimportant, the landlord leased the property to someone else; 
there was no indication that the lease terms were any different—the court gave no 
indication that there might have been a change in the market value of the leasehold. Fera 
sued, arguing that had it been able to lease the property it would have made profits over 
the ten years. Fera, testifying as an expert on his own behalf, claimed $270,000 in lost 
profits. The landlord’s expert testified that Fera would probably have lost money. The 
jury awarded Fera $200,000 in lost profits. 
 
The Michigan Supreme Court upheld the jury verdict, asserting that the claim for lost 
profits by a new business is no different from the general rules regarding claims for lost 
profits generally: 
 
These cases and others since should not be read as stating a rule of law 
which prevents every new business from recovering anticipated lost 
profits for breach of contract. The rule is merely an application of the 
doctrine that ‘(i)n order to be entitled to a verdict, or a judgment, for 
damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff must lay a basis for a 
reasonable estimate of the extent of his harm, measured in money’. 5 
Corbin on Contracts, s 1020, p. 124. The issue becomes one of sufficiency 
of proof. ‘The jury should not (be) allowed to speculate or guess upon this 
question of the amount of loss of profits.’19 
 
Thus framed, Fera’s recovery hinged on the sufficiency of proof. The court used the fact 
that both parties spent a considerable amount of effort on proving damages as evidence 
that the damage measure would not be speculative. It quoted the trial judge: 
 
                                                 
15 There is some behavioral evidence that introducing a high number, even a nonsense one, could have an 
impact on the fact-finder’s decision, biasing it upward; for a good non-technical introduction to the 
“anchoring” effect, see Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, ch. 11.  
16 242 N.W.2d 372, 92 A.L.R.3d 1278. 
17 See E. Allan Farnsworth et al, Contracts: Cases and Materials (8
th
 ed.); John P. Dawson et al, Contracts: 
Cases and Comment (10
th
 ed.); Daniel Markovits, Contract Law and Legal Methods; Gerald E. Berendt, et 
al, Contract Law and Practice (2d ed.); George W. Kuney and Robert M. Lloyd, Contracts: Transactions 
and Litigation (3
rd
 ed.). 
18 A book store with a liquor license. Probably not a great business idea.  
19 At 373-374. (emphasis added)  
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The loss of profits are often speculative and conjectural on the part of 
witnesses. When this is true, the Court should deny loss of profits because 
of the speculative nature of the testimony and the proofs. However, the 
law is also clear that where lost profits are shown, and there is ample proof 
on this point, they should not be denied merely because they are hard to 
prove. In this case, both parties presented testimony on this issue for days. 
This testimony took the lost profits issue out of the category of speculation 
and conjecture. The jury was given an instruction on loss of profits and 
what the proofs must show, and the nature of the proofs, and if they found 
them to be speculative they could not award damages therefor. The jury, 
having found damages to exist, and awarded the same in this case in 
accord with the proper instructions, the Court cannot, now, overrule the 
jury’s finding.20  
 
This is a funny argument. Because the parties tried to prove lost profits, the results were 
not speculative, and, therefore, the jury should be allowed to find lost profit damages. I 
don’t believe any other court has made that argument, although many of them do cite 
Fera when justifying their conclusion that lost profits should be awarded.
21
  
 
These jurors only had to sit through days of nonsense as opposed to the poor 
jurors in Kenford who had to endure months. Still, the only purpose of the “factual” 
inquiry was to mislead the jury. The estimates were not speculative; they were silly. 
Fera’s claim was that he had taken a ten-year lease on a space in a shopping center for a 
“book and bottle” shop and because the shopping center leased the space to someone else, 
he had lost profits for the ten-year period. After the breach, he still had the concept, his 
cash, and other potential spaces to lease. Awarding any lost profit damages assumes that 
spending money on this shop in this location was better than any alternative he might 
have had, which makes no sense.
22
  
 
My colleague, Robert Scott, upon reading this, suggested that I was just cherry 
picking “lousy lawyering” cases; the defendant’s lawyer should have been guilty of 
malpractice. Unfortunately, it was the law, not the lawyering, that was the problem. As I 
note below, Fera is cited with approval in a number of cases; none question the outcome. 
It shows up in the treatises, without any questioning of the reasoning. I searched Westlaw 
for scholarly articles citing Fera. There were 33, and, again, none questioned the 
reasoning. The Farnsworth treatise includes it in a string citation, without comment, for 
the proposition that the "rule of law which prevents every new business from recovering 
anticipated lost profits" is rejected.
23
 The Corbin treatise trumpeted the fact that Fera had 
                                                 
20 At 646-647. 
21 Citations. 
22 For another instance in which the court allowed recovery of lost profits for a lease that wasn’t, see S. 
Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-Western Corp., 58 Cal.App.3d 173 (1976).  
23
 Citation. 
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cited the previous edition;
24
 it was silent on the merits. Without a framework for analysis, 
the decision has passed without criticism into the body of law. 
 
 
2. Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. Peterson25  
 
Super Valu also concerned the breach of a promise to award a lease, but it adds one 
twist—the disappointed promisee gave up a well-paying job in anticipation of getting a 
fifteen-year lease. Peterson had been an employee for 24 years, had been president of a 
division of Super Valu, and earned $100,000 per year (in Alabama in 1984). Since Super 
Valu would not allow an employee to own a retail outlet he had to retire. The deal fell 
through and Peterson succeeded in his claim that Super Valu had breached.  
 
The trial court awarded damages for lost profits and the award was upheld on appeal. 
Rejecting Super Valu’s argument that Alabama had a per se rule against awarding lost 
profits for an unestablished business, the court adopted the “reasonable certainty” 
standard and concluded that Peterson’s evidence was sufficient to meet that standard.26  
What was that evidence? The court began with what seemed a promising statement: 
 
The fundamental basis for Peterson’s evidence as to damages was Super 
Valu’s own projections of profits, produced in its normal course of 
business long before this dispute arose. These projections were the product 
of an intense, exhaustive process involving many different Super Valu 
personnel. Super Valu’s projections resulted from the application of a 
scientific methodology that for many years had accurately predicted the 
future performance of stores associated with Super Valu.
27
 
 
The court emphasized the fact that the lost profits estimate was “based on pre-
dispute projections prepared by the defendant.
28
 The expert then took Super Valu’s 
projected profit and loss statements for the first three years ($124,684, $619,267 and 
$750,198) as the basis for projections for the remaining twelve years of the lease. 
Unfortunately, there is a gap in the court’s exposition, so we do not know how the expert 
went from these numbers to his conclusion. He concluded that over the fifteen years the 
lost profits would be over $19 million.
29
 There must have been an assumption that the 
                                                 
24
 “The court cited the prior edition of this section to show that a plaintiff must lay a basis for a reasonable 
estimate of the extent of his harm, but held that lost profits could be recovered in a new business if they 
could be proven with reasonable certainty, just as for any other business. The court cited the prior edition of 
§ 1023 (now § 15.20) to show that it is just easier to establish a reasonable certainty of lost profits in the 
case of an established business. The court cited the prior edition of § 1022 (now § 15.19) to show that 
mathematical precision is not required, where by the nature of the circumstances, precision cannot be 
attained, and particularly this is true where the defendant’s breach caused the imprecision.” ARTHUR L. 
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §56.16 n.19 (no. 16S1, 2016). 
25 506 So.2d 317 (1987). 
26 It cited Fera, amongst others in support of this position.  
27 At 330. (emphasis in original) 
28 At 331 (emphasis in original) 
29 At 332. “The sophistication of these projections of lost profits, we believe, equals or exceeds that of the 
projection methodology approved by this Court [in another case].” 
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growth in profits substantially exceeded the discount rate (assuming that the expert even 
bothered to apply any discount rate). Having certified the $19 million estimate as credible, 
the court then approved the jury verdict of $5 million. There was no hint as to why $19 
million had shrunk to $5 million.  
 
Of course, there was no basis for the $5 million either. There is no reason to 
believe that a lease to operate a small supermarket would be a better investment 
opportunity than any other. The expert’s estimate did not presume that Peterson brought 
something exceptional to the project—the estimate was apparently based on Super Valu’s 
projections with a generic operator.  Peterson’s “lost profits” should have been zero. That 
does not mean that he should not have been compensated at all. His compensation should 
have been based on his reliance. He gave up a $100,000 per year job and, according to 
the court, “Peterson expended time, energy, and money in undertaking the necessary 
actions to properly equip, staff, and outfit the County Market.”30 Compensation for at 
least some of Peterson’s reliance would be plausible.31 How much is unclear, but it would 
certainly have been a lot less than the $5 million awarded by the jury.
32
 
 
4. Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz and Schatz, Ribicoff and Kotkin
33
  
 
What makes this case of particular interest is the dissent by a very knowledgeable 
contracts scholar, Ellen Peters. That she was fundamentally wrong adds to its significance. 
Technically, the case was for lawyers’ malpractice, not breach of contract, but that can be 
ignored. The malpractice, the court found, resulted in the failure of a new firm, Beverly 
Hills Concepts (BHC). BHC’s primary business would have been the sale of franchises 
for fitness clubs. Lost profits for a new business were, the court held, recoverable, subject 
to the reasonable certainty standard. “The plaintiff argues that the present value of a 
stream of expected future profits is an appropriate way to value a business and that it is 
therefore an appropriate measure of damages. We conclude that it is proper to award 
damages for the destruction of an unestablished enterprise and that lost profits may 
constitute an appropriate measure of damages for the destruction of such an enterprise.”34 
However, the majority concluded, the plaintiff failed to prove the damages with 
                                                 
30 At 335. 
31
 The decision does not indicate whether he was employed in the interim (or whether he should have been 
employed); if so, any recovery would have to be reduced to take that into account. 
32 For another case in which a potential lessee that had made some expenditures in reliance, was 
improperly awarded lost profits and see Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Haw. 594, 597 (1980). (“In 
anticipation of operating the Chinese kitchen, plaintiffs arranged for financing, ordered equipment and 
furnishings, hired chefs and workers, advertised in the yellow pages of the telephone book for the to-be-
built kitchen, and incurred other expenses.”) In Energy Capital Corp. v. U.S., 302 F.3d 1314 (2002), HUD 
breached a contract with a firm that was supposed to make up to $200 million worth of loans to owners of 
HUD properties to install energy efficient heating systems. Rejecting the per se rule, the court found 
damages of over $10 million. The court remanded because the trial court had used a risk-free discount rate, 
holding that it should have used a risk-adjusted discount rate instead. The opportunity cost of this 
hypothetical loan portfolio would be an alternative loan portfolio with an equivalent risk profile. Lost 
profits should, therefore, have been zero. Energy Capital did incur costs in reliance and could have been 
compensated for those.  
33 247 Conn. 48 (1998) 
34 At 63. 
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reasonable certainty. The majority, I should note, cited both Super Valu and Fera as 
examples of the successful use of the reasonable certainty standard. 
 
The plaintiff’s expert witness projected sales of franchises (and resultant fees) 
over a twelve-year period and concluded that the plaintiff had suffered a loss of $15.9 
million. The majority concluded that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence 
that it would become profitable.  It also asserted that “the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to limit the recovery of lost profits to a reasonable time period.”35  
 
The opinion included sufficient information to buttress the conclusion that BHC 
had suffered no loss (except for costs incurred in reliance). BHC first contacted the law 
firm in late October 1987.
36
 
 
The plaintiff’s financial statement, prepared by Coopers, revealed that it 
was insolvent as of November 30, 1987, and its situation had deteriorated 
even further by January, 1988. It is particularly telling that the plaintiff 
had attempted to obtain financing from a number of banks as well as from 
the Small Business Administration and that it had been rejected by all of 
these institutions. According to Charles Remington, one of the plaintiff’s 
officers, this financing was necessary to the proposed franchising 
operation. Additionally, the model franchise opened by the plaintiff in 
East Hartford quickly failed. Finally, despite several months of trying, the 
plaintiff never sold a single franchise. Moreover, its own damages expert, 
Ferreira, characterized the plaintiff as a poor credit risk. These facts serve 
to indicate that the plaintiff was not financially stable and that its prospects 
for earning profits in the future were, at best, questionable.
37
 
 
Why would a firm be a poor credit risk unable to find a lender if it had available to it a 
project worth $15.9 million? Because no one in their right mind believed it. There was no 
basis for claiming that the project would exceed the opportunity cost; given the market 
evidence, it was more likely that the expected present value was negative. Of course, 
even expected negative present value projects can succeed. In her dissent Judge Peters 
invoked Apple to illustrate how startups with sketchy finances sometimes succeed: 
 
[T]he majority opinion starts out with an accurate description of the rocky 
state of the plaintiff’s finances when it came to the defendants for legal 
representation. To my mind, it is not surprising that start-up companies, in 
the first years of their operation, would have a difficult time making ends 
meet. It is not far-fetched to assume that Steve Jobs, when he started 
                                                 
35 At 77.The court made this odd argument: “We agree with the plaintiff that there is nothing inherently 
improper about allowing damages for lost profits over a twelve year period. What is improper, however, is 
to award damages over such a long time span when there is no evidence that the plaintiff would have 
survived for twelve years, let alone that it would have remained profitable for that length of time.” (At 76) 
The court did not indicate how one could possibly demonstrate that a new firm could survive for a 
particular length of time. 
36 At 52. 
37 At 60-61. 
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Apple Computers, might have had difficulty in obtaining financing for so 
untested an idea as a personal computer. At that time, how could he have 
projected future profits with analytic precision?
38
 
 
That simply reinforces the notion that ex post some investments are great successes (and 
some are not). For projects that were aborted, we have only the ex ante information and, 
unless there is a credible reason to believe otherwise, the expected value of the loss 
would be zero. 
 
 Judge Peters had a legitimate concern. The wrongdoer should not be allowed to 
get away with its bad behavior without any liability. “We condone professional 
misconduct if we discharge these defendants of all liability to a plaintiff that has tried, as 
best it could, to quantify the loss that the defendants’ misconduct has caused it to 
suffer.”39 The difficulty was that the doctrine had boxed the court in. It appeared to allow 
for only two choices: either let experts dispute over “lost profits” or hold that the 
measures were not reasonably certain and, therefore, damages would be zero. There was 
a third way. By recognizing that the lost profit measure was spurious, we can focus 
instead on what the plaintiff actually lost, namely, expenditures in reliance upon the 
defendant’s not engaging in malpractice. 
 
  Judge Peters quoted an earlier opinion that would have limited the reviewing 
court’s discretion in reviewing a damage award: “The amount of a damage award is a 
matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact . . . . The size of the verdict alone 
does not determine whether it is excessive. The only practical test to apply to this verdict 
is whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the 
conclusion that the [trier of fact] was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or 
corruption.”40 If reviewing courts were to so constrain themselves, the likelihood is high 
that juries would overcompensate plaintiffs. 
 
5. Franchise Cases 
 
In his treatise on the Recovery of Lost Profits, Robert Dunn argued in favor of 
awarding lost profit damages to an aspiring franchisee: 
 
The supposed rule that lost profits damages of an unestablished business 
are not recoverable would seem to be least justifiable when the business to 
be established is a location for a national franchise.  Each store is cast 
from the same mold.  The locations are rigidly controlled by the national 
franchisor.  Projections are available based on extensive experience in 
other stores from which sales and profits can be derived with a high 
                                                 
38 At 87. 
39 At 95. She criticized the majority: “As a matter of principle, the majority opinion subscribes to the 
position advanced by the defendants that, no matter how egregious and protracted their professional 
misconduct, it is more appropriate for this court to take an unnecessarily rigorous view of proof of damages 
than to provide relief for the plaintiff.” (At 80)  
40 At 89. Quoting Grayson v. Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, 231 Conn. at 183–84, 646 A.2d 
195.(Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
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degree of certainty.  These projections are the basis for the franchisor’s 
selection of the new location and the franchisee’s investment in it.  If the 
figures are good enough for the parties to invest their money, it would 
seem that they should be good enough for a court. 
*   *   * 
If plaintiff can demonstrate that its operations at the new location would 
be comparable to those at its existing location, then adequate probative 
evidence may be introduced to demonstrate damages with the requisite 
reasonable certainty.
41
 
 
That sounds plausible, and many courts have bought it. But the relevant question should 
not be whether the franchisee would do as well in this location as anywhere else. Rather 
it should be whether there is reason to believe that it would do better, and the answer to 
that should be negative. Indeed, the very notion of basing the compensation on the 
earnings of comparable franchises presumes that the plaintiff would not do better. Nor 
should the plaintiff have expected to do better than the opportunity cost of his capital or 
his time. That does not mean that the plaintiff should not be compensated. The basis for 
the compensation would not, however, be the lost profits as defined by Dunn. 
 
 As his illustration, Dunn chose a case that did not pit a franchisor against a 
disappointed franchisee. In Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc.,
42
 
McDonald’s was the plaintiff. The defendant had, it was alleged, tortuously interfered 
with MacDonald’s contractual relations. McDonald’s had entered into a conditional lease 
of a parcel of property to add a franchised outlet. A competitor attempted to prevent the 
entry of the competing restaurant. At trial the court held that there had been interference 
with McDonald’s contract with the landowner. While the landowner did receive 
compensation, McDonald’s was denied. The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded for 
errors in the charge to the jury, but it also considered whether McDonald’s would have 
had a valid claim for damages. It first noted McDonald’s history of success: 
 
McDonald’s marketing research manager had testified. He described the 
uniformity of procedures utilized at all McDonald’s restaurants, its 
training and national advertising programs, and the efforts made to 
maintain standards and quality. This witness informed the judge and jury 
that while in 1962 there were 800 units in operation, this number had 
increased at trial time to 1,200. He also reported an amazing record of 
successes—not one restaurant has failed. The trial justice ordered this 
testimony be stricken.
43
 
 
The court then concluded that compensation would be appropriate: 
 
Having in mind America’s acceptance of McDonald’s method of 
                                                 
41 §§4.7-4.8. At 398-400. 
42 112 R.I. 203 (1973). 
43 At 213. 
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merchandising, we believe the requisite evidentiary basis had been 
established so that the jury could with ‘reasonable certainty’ make a 
determination of the profit loss sustained as the result of McDonald’s 
lengthy preoccupation with litigation, rather than the distribution of 
hamburgers, at its Middletown location.
44
 
 
The court did not indicate whether McDonald’s ever opened the outlet. That would not 
matter for lost profits damages calculated a la Dunn. But it would make a difference if we 
recognize that Dunn’s standard (and implicitly the court’s) is the wrong one. If the outlet 
did open, then a plausible measure of the harm caused by the delay would be based on the 
actual earnings; damages for delay are discussed in more detail in Section III. If the outlet 
did not open, then damages should be based on McDonald’s reliance—for example, legal 
costs incurred because of the defendant’s wrongful behavior. Neither of these remedies 
bears any relationship to the “lost profits.” 
 
6.  Brundige v. Sherwin-Williams Co.
45 
 
 
 I am not arguing that the lost profit remedy should never be used. Brundige 
presents a situation in which the lost profit remedy would probably have been appropriate. 
Brundige, who had a non-compete agreement, had been employed by Sherwin-Williams 
for ten years at a particular location. Sherwin-Williams relocated, whereupon Brundige 
quit and opened the business at the old location. The firm obtained a TRO to prevent his 
operating the store; ultimately, the TRO was dissolved and Brundige sued for the losses 
incurred by not operating during the period the TRO was in force. Brundige brought 
many specific assets to the project, as the court noted: 
 
In the case before us . . . the appellant had substantial experience in the 
retail paint sales business; he undoubtedly had a reputation in the 
community as a man of experience; his place of business was the same 
building where a business like his had been located for some time; he did 
open his business almost immediately after the injunction was dissolved; 
and he made a profit his first month and every month thereafter for the 
first six months he was in business.
46
 
 
One could argue that it is precisely these characteristics that would have led Sherwin-
Williams to want to enforce the non-compete covenant in the first place. The court does 
not say whether there would have been competition between the old and new locations. 
Apparently, it concluded that any such competition did not justify enforcement of the 
covenant. Having so concluded it then had to determine Brundige’s damages. Brundige 
was sitting with a bunch of assets that were valuable only at this location and for this 
purpose. The loss should be the return on these specific assets during the period the TRO 
was in effect, and the best evidence of that would be the actual earnings after the TRO 
was lifted. If Brundige had managed to earn anything during the interim period there 
                                                 
44 At 214. 
45 551 S.W.2d 268 (1977) 
46 At 271. 
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could be an offset, but the basic point is that the expected returns would be positive, 
taking into account the specific assets Brundige brought to the table. 
 
Brundige illustrates an important qualification to the argument. If the plaintiff brings 
specific assets to the project, the expected returns would be positive. These could be 
assets that were acquired in reliance on this particular transaction, or they could simply 
be assets that the plaintiff happened to have, assets that would be of use on this particular 
project, but could not be easily deployed to another. 
 
II. Royalties, Etc. 
 
The recent treatment of the new business rule in New York revolves around the 
Kenford litigation. In the Appellate Court’s first shot, it was confronted with two 
precedents. In 1918 the New York Court of Appeals took what was then the majority 
position, holding in Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co.
47
 that a new business could 
not recover for lost profits. Over half a century later, in Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. 
Singer Co.,
48
 the Second Circuit, interpreting a contract under New York law, refined the 
test: “Although lost profits in a new venture are not ordinarily recoverable (Cramer v. 
Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 223 N.Y. 63, 119 N.E. 227 (1918)), they may be awarded 
where: the loss of prospective profits are the direct and proximate result of the breach; 
profits were contemplated by the parties when they entered the contract; and there is a 
rational basis on which to calculate the lost profits.”49 The Kenford Appellate Court 
interpreted Perma Research as qualifying Cramer: “What the court did in Perma 
Research, in essence, was to add a third requirement for new businesses by requiring 
them to establish some rational basis on which to calculate the lost profits. By so holding, 
the court converted the Cramer rule of nonrecoverability into a rule of evidence.”50 
 The “rational basis” test was soundly rejected by the Court of Appeals: “It is our 
view that the record in this case demonstrates the efficacy of the principles set forth by 
this court in [Cramer], principles to which we continue to adhere. In so doing, we 
specifically reject the ‘rational basis’ test enunciated in [Perma Research] and adopted by 
the Appellate Division.”51 And so, it would appear, New York continues to honor the per 
se rule. The Court of Appeals opinion was unanimous (indeed per curiam).  
 
Less than a decade later the same court was confronted with another new business 
claim in Ashland Management Inc. v. Janien,
52
 and again produced a unanimous opinion. 
The court invoked its Kenford decision, but instead of the per se rule, it characterized 
Kenford as holding that for “a new business seeking to recover loss of future profits, a 
stricter standard is imposed because there is no experience from which lost profits may 
                                                 
47 223 N.Y. 63 (1918). 
48
 402 F. Supp. 881, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) aff'd sub nom. Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 
111 (2d Cir. 1976) 
49 At ___.  
50
 At 140. 
51 Kenford Co., Inc. v. Erie County, 67 N.Y.2d 257, 263; 493 N.E.2d 234, 502 N.Y.S.2d 131. 
52 82 N.Y.2d 395 (1993). 
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be estimated with reasonable certainty and other methods of evaluation may be too 
speculative. . . . Whether the claim involves an established business or a new business, 
however, the test remains the same, i.e., whether future profits can be calculated with 
reasonable certainty.”53  
 
How can we reconcile the court’s notion that, on the one hand, it is applying the 
Kenford per se rule (no lost profits for an unestablished business) while finding that the 
plaintiff only had to satisfy the reasonable certainty standard (and did so)? Logically, I 
don’t think we can. If, however, we recognize that the new business rule lumped together 
very different types of claims, the outcome (if not the rationale) makes more sense. In the 
cases in Section I, the claim was for consequential damages—because you breached, I 
did not make an investment on which I would have made a lot of money. In Perma 
Research and Ashland and similar cases, the claim is for direct damages—I sold you an 
asset for a future stream of payments and you have not paid. The expected value in the 
former case (subject to the qualifications noted above) was zero; in the latter case, it was 
positive. 
1. Perma Research 
Perma Research assigned its patents for an automotive anti-skid device to Singer 
and was to receive royalty payments. Since the devices had not yet been perfected the 
agreement required continued collaboration. Singer decided not to proceed and the court 
held that by failing to use its best efforts Singer had breached the agreement. The trial 
judge found damages of about $7 million after prejudgment interest was included. The 
Court of Appeals approved, but it provided only generic language in support: “In simple 
terms, the measure of the damage is the amount necessary to put the injured party in 
exact position as he would have been if the contract had not been breached. If Singer had 
put its resources and ingenuity to the anti-skid device, it probably would have been 
successful in the marketing of the same. Nor are the damages too speculative to assess. 
At the outset, since Singer produced the damage, it must bear the uncertainty of proof.”54 
The decision does not specify how the court arrived at the damage estimate, although it 
appears that it simply projected sales (presuming that the product would have been 
perfected), multiplied by the royalty rate, and, perhaps, found the present discounted 
value of the projected stream of royalty payments. 
 
If we accept the court’s conclusion on liability, then it is clear that Perma 
Research did suffer a loss. It had already incurred the costs of getting the product to the 
point of being nearly marketable. It still had some financial obligations, but these were 
minor. We could look at either the expected return on the investment or the costs it had 
incurred as a starting point in calculating damages. There is no reason to believe that a 
remedy based on either of these would yield the same result as the “lost profits,” the 
projected stream of royalty payments. In the absence of any contract language to the 
contrary, Perma Research should have received compensation.  
                                                 
53 At  404. 
54 At 116. 
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But the contract was not silent as the dissent observed: “The contract provided 
that defendant ‘in its absolute discretion shall determine the method of manufacturing, 
exploiting and marketing the Product’ but gave plaintiff the right to reacquire its device if 
defendant failed to spend at least one hundred thousand dollars for ‘marketing, promoting 
and advertising’ in any year beginning with 1966.”55 Moreover, Singer was obligated to 
pay roughly $500,000 even if it produced no units.
56
 My concern is not whether the 
contract language supplanted the default damage rule. The point I want to emphasize is 
that when, as in this case, the bulk of the plaintiff’s costs have already been incurred, the 
expected value of the claim is positive, not zero as in the previous Section.  
2.  Ashland Management Inc. v. Janien 
 
Janien was an employee of an investment advisory company. He developed a 
stock selection strategy, Eta, for the firm. There was some dispute as to whether the 
contract that he and the firm had been negotiating was binding and the court concluded 
that it was. That contract said that “if ‘for any reason’ Janien left Ashland’s employment 
he was entitled to ‘a royalty of the higher of $50,000 or 15% of gross revenues per annum 
of any and all existing or future accounts’ using the Eta model or ‘any derivative thereof’. 
The gross revenue was the 1% fee charged customers by Ashland for the funds under 
management.”57  After he was fired, Ashland sought a permanent injunction to bar Janien 
from using Eta. Janien counterclaimed for damages, his lost profits under the contract.  
 
After reaffirming the Kenford per se rule, the court then misapplied it, finding that 
Janien could recover lost profits, notwithstanding that this was a new business. The court 
concluded that “it is manifest from an examination of [the contract] that the parties 
contemplated that Janien could recover damages if the agreement was not completed and 
that those damages could include lost profits from accounts using Eta.”58 
 
[T]he issue of future earnings was not only contemplated but also fully 
debated and analyzed by sophisticated business professionals at the time 
of these extended contract negotiations, projections of the increments to be 
anticipated over the years were calculated and provisions made for 
Janien’s share of the anticipated profits. Inasmuch as Janien was entitled 
to damages based upon the revenues derived from “any and all existing or 
future” accounts, plaintiff must have foreseen that if it breached the 
contract defendant would be entitled to lost profits.
59
 
 
The court then concluded that Janien had met the burden of proving lost profits 
with reasonable certainty. But, like Perma Research, the issue should not have been 
certainty. Janien had already developed Eta; the investment had already been sunk. His 
damage claim was only for the future stream of earnings from his investment. Had the 
                                                 
55 At 120. 
56 At 120. 
57 At 400-401. 
58 At 404-05. 
59 At 405. 
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court framed the question in this way it could have avoided the intellectual contortions it 
engaged in by attempting to conform the result to the Kenford per se rule. 
 
3. MindGames, Inc. v. Western Pub. Co., Inc. 
60
 
 
 MindGames is another case involving royalty payments for a preexisting item. 
The developer of a game, Clever Endeavor, licensed it to Western, a major marketer of 
games. Western would pay a 15% royalty for around four years. In addition, Western had 
an annual option to renew for $300,000 per year. In the first year the royalty payment was 
$600,000 but afterwards sales fell precipitously. Western, according to MindGames, 
breached the agreement by its inadequate promotional effort.
61
 The opinion is unclear as 
to the nature of the plaintiff’s damage theory. It appears to be that but for the alleged 
inadequate performance of Western, a lot more games would have been sold and (I think 
but the opinion is really unclear about this) the agreement would have been renewed so 
that even more games could have been sold in the future.  
 
The trial judge, invoking a 75-year-old Arkansas decision,
62
 held that the new 
business rule barred recovery of lost profits and granted summary judgment to Western. 
On appeal, Judge Posner concluded that, given the chance, Arkansas would overrule that 
precedent and would abandon the new business rule.
63
 In its stead he would use “the 
serviceable and familiar standard of excessive speculativeness.”64 He rejected the new 
business rule and replaced it with a standard that would apply to new and existing 
businesses alike.  
Just as a start-up company should not be permitted to obtain pie-in-the-sky 
damages upon allegations that it was snuffed out before it could begin to 
operate (unlike the ice factory in Marvell, which did begin production, 
albeit a little later than planned), … capitalizing fantasized earnings into a 
huge present value sought as damages, so a novice writer should not be 
permitted to obtain damages from his publisher on the premise that but for 
the latter's laxity he would have had a bestseller, when only a tiny fraction 
of new books achieve that success. Damages must be proved, and not just 
dreamed.
65
  
 
                                                 
60 218 F.3d 652 C.A.7 (Wis.),2000. 
61 According to the dissent: “MindGames' complaint alleged that a substantial number of games produced 
by Western failed to meet quality standards; Western failed to promote and make reasonable efforts to sell; 
and its efforts did not meet standards under the agreement or those recognized in the industry. It is 
MindGames' position that these failures caused loss of sales.” (At 660) 
62
 Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General Electric Co., 162 Ark. 467, 259 S.W. 741 (1924). 
63 In rejecting the new business rule, Judge Posner claimed that it could lead to an absurd result: “Suppose 
a first-time author sued a publisher for an accounting, and the only issue was how many copies the 
publisher had sold. Under the ‘new business’ rule as construed by Western, the author could not recover his 
lost royalties even though there was no uncertainty about what he had lost.” (At 657) However, there is no 
reason to believe that the rule would prevent recovery of past due payments. 
64 At 658. 
65 At 658. 
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The plaintiff had claimed future royalties of $40 million, which would have required 
sales of about 10 million games.
66
 In rejecting the claim, Judge Posner emphasized the 
plaintiff’s lack of a track record. “He could not point to other games that he had invented 
and that had sold well.”67 Because “[i]t pointed to no evidence from which lost royalties 
could be calculated to even a rough approximation . . . [he found] its silence eloquent and 
Western's argument compelling, and so the judgment in favor of Western is affirmed.”68 
Indeed, he asserted, “[w]hen the breach occurred, MindGames should have terminated 
the contract and sought distribution by other means .  . . . The fact that it did not do so—
that so far as appears it has made no effort to market ‘Clever Endeavor’ since the market 
for the game collapsed in 1991—is telling evidence of a lack of commercial promise 
unrelated to Western's conduct.”69 Since the contract gave Western a renewal option, and 
since it did not renew, MindGames’ claim would have been based on future sales by an 
unidentified third party. The fact that it found no such third party does suggest that the 
future royalty stream would have not amounted to much. 
 
But probably more than zero. MindGames might have been able to argue that Western 
had destroyed the brand image by producing a poor product; had it produced a quality 
product, the future sales would have been greater. Yes, projecting those sales would have 
been speculative, but it could be done; to reach that step MindGames would first have to 
show that the quality of the games was so substandard that industry experts would testify 
that the reputation could not be salvaged.
70
 If it surmounted that hurdle, then the parties 
could put forth competing estimates of future sales and royalties. To be sure, some of the 
estimates would be absurd. If the parties did not constrain the damages ex ante, then a 
judge could impose some logic on the process ex post. Both the “new business” and the 
“reasonable certainty” approach give the judge one blunt weapon to rein in the experts—
the threat of zero.  
 
This was a classic case of a plaintiff winning the battle but losing the war. The court 
rejected the per se new business defense, but then held that because damages were too 
speculative, they would, therefore, be zero. Compounding the plaintiff’s pain, Judge 
Posner noted: “Although the victim of a breach of contract is entitled to nominal 
damages, . . . MindGames does not seek them . . . . By not seeking nominal damages, 
incidentally, MindGames may have lost a chance to obtain significant attorneys' fees, to 
which Arkansas law entitles a prevailing party in a breach of contract case.”71 Had the 
case been remanded, as the dissent proposed, MindGames might at least have recovered 
its attorney fees. 
 
In the well-known case of Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc.
72
 the court did 
award only nominal damages (six cents) to an author when a publisher chose not to 
                                                 
66 At 654. The decision does not indicate the basis for this projection. 
67 At 659. 
68 At 659. 
69 At 659. 
70 I presume that the contract was silent on Western’s meeting any quality standard and the consequences, 
if any, of a failure to do so. 
71 At 654. 
72 41 A.D.2d 371, 343 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1973) modified, 34 N.Y.2d 379, 314 N.E.2d 419 (1974). 
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publish his book. While not explicitly invoking the new business rule, the New York 
Court of Appeals held: “His expectancy interest in the royalties—the profit he stood to 
gain from sale of the published book—while theoretically compensable, was 
speculative. . . . . In these circumstances, his claim for royalties falls for uncertainty.”73 
There are two problems with this. First, Freund did not attempt to prove lost royalties, nor 
did he even ask for them. The denial was pure dictum.
74
 Second, the contract gave Freund 
a sizable advance against royalties, so he was implicitly compensated for the royalties on 
about 2,000 books.
75
 Recovery could be denied, not because the claimant had a new 
business, but because it could not plausibly show that the future royalties would have 
exceeded the advance. Again, as in Perma Research, I do not claim that the ex ante 
payment does, or should, supplant the default rule. The essential point is that when the 
claim is for lost royalties, the expected loss would be positive. 
 
III. Delay and Defect 
 
In MindGames, Judge Posner noted: “The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, often 
prevents the victim of a breach of contract from obtaining lost profits, but that rule is not 
invoked here. Neither the ‘new business’ rule nor the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale stands 
for the general proposition that lost profits are never a recoverable item of damages in a 
tort or breach of contract case.”76 In Hadley, of course, the breach caused a delay. Delay 
was also the issue in a number of new business cases. Interestingly, one of the earliest 
involved a contract entered into the year before the Hadley decision and it concerned the 
delayed construction of a flour mill (Abbott v. Gatch).
77
  
 
1. Delay  
 
In Abbott v. Gatch, a contractor was found to have missed the contractual 
deadline for constructing a mill by about three months. The court rejected the owner’s 
claim for lost profits: 
 
We cannot adopt any estimate of profits that Abbott might have realized 
from working the mill, because these were merely speculative, depending 
on the quantity of flour it might grind, the fluctuations of the market, as to 
prices of flour and grain, and the remote contingencies of his being able to 
procure wheat, labor and fuel, as well as the continuance of the mill in 
running order, free from accidents and loss of time from other causes.
78
 
 
However, this did not mean that the owner would not receive any compensation. 
“Considering the uncertainties attending the milling business, and the difficulty of 
defining a safer guide for juries, we are of opinion, that a fair rent is the most reasonable 
                                                 
73 At 383. 
74 It has misled many commentators; see, for example, Melvin Eisenberg, “Probability and Chance in 
Contract Law,” 45 UCLA Law Review 1005, 1056-57 (1998). 
75 For more detail on Freund, see Goldberg, Rethinking Contract Law and Contract Design, ch. 5. 
76 At 655. 
77 13 Md. 314 (1859). 
78 At 333-34. 
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standard of the defendant’s loss by reason of the plaintiff’s failure to complete the 
mill.”79 The court gave no indication as to how a “fair rent” should be determined. There 
are a number of possible measures, none very good. One possibility, albeit unlikely, 
would be the expected revenues less the projected operating costs and cost of capital 
(which would amount to projected lost profits minus the cost of capital). That would 
entail the same problems the court recognized when rejecting “lost profits.” A second 
possibility would be to apply a discount rate to construction costs (or the construction 
plus land acquisition costs). A third would find a comparable, although it is hard to 
imagine that there are any rented flour mills to compare with.  
  
This was not just a nineteenth century anomaly. The rental value measure showed 
up again in Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead,
80
 decided in 1955. A contractor was 
hired to clear a site for the construction of a drive-in theater. There was a delay, probably 
attributable to inaccuracies in the initial survey, which made the project much more 
difficult. There was a dispute over who should pay for the additional 8,000 cubic yards of 
dirt required to complete the project. Evergreen withheld payment for that work and the 
contractor sued. Evergreen then counterclaimed for lost profits as a result of the delay. 
The court denied the counterclaim, invoking the new business rule. Citing Abbott v. 
Gatch, the court concluded: “We think the [trial] court was right in basing the damages 
for delay in the completion of the site on fair rental value and the actual monetary losses 
incurred.”81 Again, the court was silent on how one might determine the fair market 
rental value of a drive-in theater. 
 
Alternatively, the plaintiff could argue that since the mill or theater had been 
completed and was operable, a reasonable estimate of the harm could be based on the 
actual operations in a given period. That was the approach taken (unsuccessfully) by the 
claimant in Cramer v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co.
82
 When it reasserted the per se rule 
in Kenford, the New York Court of Appeals harkened back to Cramer. That case 
involved the delayed delivery of furniture (price $1,376.75) necessary for opening a retail 
store. The trial judge instructed the jury: “If a man has arranged to start a business at a 
certain time, and is prevented from starting it by reason of wrong or breach of contract by 
somebody else, he is entitled to recover whatever profits he can show he would have 
made during that time for the breach of contract by the other party.”83 The plaintiff had 
relied on data on sales and costs after it finally opened in determining its lost profits, 
arguably for a comparable period of time. It claimed lost profits of about $6,000 and 
additional losses of around $800. The jury award did not break damages out by category. 
It awarded $3,310 and the trial judge reduced the award further to $1,500. The jury 
instruction, said the Court of Appeals, was reversible error. Only data from past 
performance would be allowed and it would be impossible for a new business to generate 
such data.  
 
                                                 
79 At 334. 
80 206 Md. 610 (1955). 
81
 At 621. 
82 223 N.Y. 63 (1918). 
83 At 67. 
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If the only question was whether such data would be adequate for proving losses, the 
result was surely wrong. The parties might quibble about the appropriate time period for 
comparison and other issues, but the data would be just as real as the data that an existing 
firm would have presented. The more significant question is the Hadley question. Putting 
it in the “tacit assumption” framework, fashionable at that time (and still one that I 
prefer),
84
 would a seller of furniture know that if it were late the buyer could not open its 
business, and would it agree that it would pay for all lost profits prior to the opening, 
even though it knows virtually nothing about the nature of the buyer’s business? I would 
say No; others might disagree, but for my purposes in this paper the important point is 
that the fact that Cramer’s was a new business was irrelevant for determining the 
damages. 
 
Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General Electric Co.
85
 was similar to Cramer. Marvell 
was the Arkansas precedent cited in MindGames, for the notion that there was a per se 
rule against awarding lost profits for a new business. Judge Posner quite properly noted 
that it was a delay case and questioned why a court would have found computation of 
damages difficult. 
 
Marvell was a classic Hadley v. Baxendale type of case—in fact 
virtually a rerun of Hadley, except that the appellants alleged that they had 
notified the seller of the icemaking machinery of the damages that they 
would suffer if delivery was delayed, and the seller had agreed to be liable 
for those damages. The decision is puzzling in light of that allegation; it is 
doubly puzzling because, assuming that by the time of the trial the ice 
factory was up and running, it should not have been difficult to compute 
the damages that the appellants had lost by virtue of the five and a half 
month delay in placing the factory in operation. Presumably it would have 
had five and a half months of additional profits.
86
 
 
He is, of course, correct. Unlike in the opportunity cost cases, the losses were real and 
easy to measure. The only question should have been whether the Hadley rule precluded 
recovery. 
  
In Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick
87
  the lost profits claim did succeed and the court 
specifically addressed the Hadley issue.
88
 Cook was constructing a manufacturing plant 
which opened eight months late because the supplier, Chief, failed to deliver parts on 
time.
89
 Cook sued and the jury awarded lost profits based on the actual operation in the 
                                                 
84 See Goldberg, Rethinking, ch. 8. 
85  162 Ark. 467, 259 S.W. 741 (1924). 
86 At 655. 
87 664 P.2d 1161 (1983). 
88 For another delay case in which the court rejected the per se rule, see Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe 
Associates, Inc., 296 S.C. 207, 214, 371 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1988). However, the court concluded that the 
claimant’s proof was inadequate and awarded nothing. 
89 Cook brought suit against both the manufacturer, Chief, and the dealer, Warnick. The latter was 
exonerated. (At 1164) 
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first two months, $56,908.
90
 As in the previous two cases, there is no real question about 
the adequacy of proof—the actual profits after the plant was on line were a good enough 
proxy for the profits missed during the delay. Chief, urged “adoption of the ‘tacit 
agreement test’ of foreseeability.”91 However, the court noted that the tacit assumption 
test had been rejected by the UCC and concluded that the “evidence is sufficient to 
support a conclusion that Chief had reason to know that an inordinate delay on its part 
could prevent Cook’s production and sale of slurry, thereby causing a loss of profits.”92 I 
am not concerned with whether or not the finding is correct; given its finding, the court 
framed the question in Hadley terms and held, in effect, that the seller bore the risk of the 
costs arising from delay. 
2. Defects 
In the delay cases where the plaintiff did subsequently operate, the actual earnings 
could provide a reasonable estimate of the damages. The recoverability of those damages 
would be subject to two qualifications. The first was the possibility that the Hadley rule 
would bar recovery.
93
 The second was the possibility that the parties contracted over the 
issue with either a disclaimer or a damage limitation.  Defect cases raise similar questions.  
I will focus on two in which the courts held that the lost profits were recoverable but then 
rejected the claim on measurability grounds. 
a. Mid-America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., Ltd.94  
In Mid-America, the defendant stipulated that there had been a breach of express 
warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and breach of implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose, so the only issue was damages. The buyer had been in 
the table linen business and wanted to launch a dinnerware business to complement it. It 
entered into a contract with Mogi, a Japanese firm, to provide the ceramic dinnerware. 
Unfortunately, the dinnerware exceeded FDA regulatory guidance levels for leachable 
lead. Mid-America stopped shipping the dinnerware to its customers and recalled all that 
had already been shipped. The jury found incidental damages of around $57,000.
95
 At 
issue was the claim for lost profits, about $300,000 in the first year (1994) and $2.6 
million over the next decade.
96
 
                                                 
90 At 1163-64) Cook had asked for $100,000. According to the court the average monthly profits for the 
first thirteen months of operation were $35,650, which would have meant lost profits of roughly $280,000. 
There is no discussion of the discrepancy. 
91 At 1167. 
92 At 1167. 
93 The Hadley rule is typically referred to as “foreseeability.” I find that to be an unhelpful and misleading 
term; see Rethinking, ch. 8-10. For those who feel comfortable with it, feel free to substitute it for Hadley 
in the text.  
94 100 F.3d 1353 (1996). 
95 The court did not say what was included under “incidental damages”; I presume that it included the 
costs of the recall and, perhaps, some of the costs of management time dealing with the problem.  
96 Cite. The defendant did not contest the 1994 damages. 
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The Seventh Circuit panel, asserting that to deny recovery for lost profits “would 
be tantamount to holding that the defendant could breach this particular contract with 
impunity,” held that Wisconsin would permit recovery of lost profits for a new 
business.
97
 Invoking both Fera and Super Valu, it continued, “The determination as to 
whether future profits were within the contemplation of the parties when contracting 
necessarily turns on the specific facts established at trial. . . . There is no basis to 
conclude that evidence as to the foreseeability of Mid–America’s lost future profits 
should be excluded as a matter of law.”98 The evidence presented by Mid-America’s 
expert witnesses was the best available evidence and therefore it could not be excluded as 
a matter of law. 
After arguing at length that the lost profits claim was not barred, the court then 
rejected the expert’s damage estimate for the post-1994 period holding that it was 
“monstrously excessive.”99 It criticized the expert’s sales projections as being wildly 
optimistic and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not say whether this 
component of damages should be determined on retrial or whether the claim was too 
speculative and should therefore be zero. The defense expert had attacked various 
elements of the projections, but even he conceded that “there clearly were lost profits.”100 
However, this claim is basically the same as Fera’s and others from Section I. There is no 
reason to believe that the rewards to future expenditure on this project would be any 
better than anything else Mid-America could have done with the same funds. The lost 
profits would be zero, not because of a per se rule, but because the expected value of the 
future expenditures on this project is the opportunity cost of the funds.
101
 
b.   Olathe v Browning
102
 
In Mid-America, the buyer did not make further expenditures, hence the zero profit 
outcome. In Olathe v Browning the buyer did continue and that raised a different question. 
I must note first that, unlike Mid-America, the existence of a limitation on remedies was 
a significant issue. As is quite common, Browning sold its goods conditional on a repair 
and replace remedy limitation. Or, at least it tried to do so. A considerable portion of the 
opinion (about 8,000 words) dealt with whether the limitation was part of the contract 
and the court concluded that, as a matter of law, it was not.
103
 Thus, it was open to Olathe 
to prove damages, including lost profits damages. However, the trial court and the Kansas 
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the expert witness’s damage measurement, concluding 
that it was too speculative. 
                                                 
97 For an argument that this was an inaccurate statement of Wisconsin law, see L. Katie Mason, “Mid-
America Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co.: The Seventh Circuit’s Tasty Recipe For New Business 
Recovery Of Future Lost Profits Under Wisconsin Law, Or A Suspicious Side Dish Wisconsin Won’t Try?” 
2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1385 
98 At 1362-3 
99 At 1367. 
100 At 1376. 
101
 Mid-America might have argued that because of its existing table linen business it had complementary 
assets which made the expected returns in the dinnerware market greter than the opportunity cost of capital. 
102 259 Kan. 735 (1996). 
103 I confess that I found the court’s reasoning unpersuasive. 
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Browning manufactured bearings, which were a component part for a new product 
that Olathe designed and sold, the 866 Tub Grinder. Because the 866 Tub Grinder was a 
new product, this would be classified as a new business, potentially subject to the new 
business rule. The bearings failed causing the tub grinders to malfunction. Olathe sued 
for damages for the tub grinders that had been damaged and for lost profits on its future 
sales. Unlike Mid-America, it continued in the business. To understand the damage 
theories, it is necessary to note that the failure was on the 10-foot tub grinders and that 
this model was subsequently supplanted by the 12-foot tub grinder. Because the first trial 
ended in a mistrial, Olathe’s expert presented two estimates. For the first trial, he argued 
that Olathe’s damaged reputation resulted in a loss of sales; lost profits were $4.3 
million.
104
 However, at his deposition before the second trial, the economic expert 
“admitted that his planned testimony for the first trial—that Olathe lost $4.3 million in 
lost profits due to the lost sales of 10–foot tub grinders—was 100% wrong.” 105 Olathe’s 
market share (of 10-foot grinders) did not fall. In fact, it was greater than had been 
expected had the bearing problems not occurred. Undaunted, he proposed a different 
theory.
106
 Because it had to put so much of its resources into redesigning the 10-foot 
grinders, its development of the12-foot grinders was delayed and the delay resulted in a 
loss of its share of the 12-foot grinder market.
107
 This resulted in an estimate of lost 
profits of about $8 million.
108
  
 
Olathe argued that under the “certainty” rule it only had to prove that it had 
actually suffered damages and that certainty was not necessary to prove the actual 
amount. In upholding the trial judge’s decision to bar the expert’s testimony, the court 
said: “Olathe’s evidence regarding the new lost profit theory was based on rumors, 
guesses, and assumptions. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that 
the lost profit evidence was speculative as a matter of law.”109 Note two things. First, it 
presumes implicitly that there is some boundary at which “rumors, guesses, and 
assumptions” are so egregious that there is a shift from a matter of fact to a matter of law. 
Second, the court’s concern appears to be the quality of the inputs, not the damage theory 
itself. If only the expert had been more rigorous in assembling the data, the damage 
report would have been admissible. 
The issue should not have been the certainty of the damage estimate; the expert 
was measuring the wrong thing. Olathe’s expected damages, beyond the costs 
associated with the damaged grinders and the possible redesign effort, were the delay 
costs and, as noted above, these should be subject to the Hadley rule—what would be 
the expected cost of coming to the market a few months later (mainly, the time value of 
money).
110
 The delay would entail a real loss and the contract would determine which 
                                                 
104 At 758. 
105 At 761. 
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 There was no explanation for Olathe’s decision to use the same expert the second time around. 
107 “[A]ccording to Olathe, . . . it was required to pour all of its resources into the redesign of the 10–foot 
tub grinder and that Olathe would have used these resources to develop a 12–foot tub grinder had the 
bearings in the 10–foot grinder not been faulty.” (At 765-6) 
108 At 760. 
109 At 767. 
110 That is the equivalent of the rental value in Abbott and Evergreen. 
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party would bear the risk. If recovery were to be denied, the reason should not be the 
newness of the business; rather it should be that by creating a forcing default, the 
parties would be induced to deal with the problem ex ante with a disclaimer or 
liquidated damages clause. Ironically, in this instance the court went out of its way to 
hold as a matter of law that these defenses were not available. 
IV. Anticipatory Repudiation 
Suppose that a seller has begun performance of a long-term contract, but it has not 
yet delivered any output. If the buyer were to breach, would the seller have a viable claim 
for lost profits? There are two different scenarios. In the first, at the time of the buyer’s 
repudiation there had been no market change. In the second, market conditions had 
deteriorated.  
In Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc.
111
 the trial 
judge misused the new business rule in denying the plaintiff’s recovery. To simplify the 
facts, the seller (AEP) agreed to build a power plant and the buyer agreed to a twenty-
year take-or-pay contract. After the seller had spent about $500 million on the plant, but 
before it actually had produced any power, the market collapsed and the buyer (TEMI) 
repudiated. The trial judge denied recovery for lost profits on two grounds—the project 
was a new business and determination of lost profits was too speculative. I will come to 
the “speculative” question below, but first I want to consider the new business issue, with 
a variation on the facts.  
Suppose, contrary to fact, that the market conditions had not changed at all—
should the seller receive any compensation? In one sense the problem is the same as that 
in Fera. There is no reason to believe that subsequent performance of this contract would 
be any more profitable for AEP than its alternatives. The difference is that in Fera the 
plaintiff had not made any investments in reliance on the lease. Here, AEP had spent 
$500 million. There should be no recovery for future lost profits. Since market conditions 
had not changed, the expected value of the future stream of profits had not changed. 
However, compensation based on AEP’s reliance would be relevant. That would depend 
on the alternative use of the power plant. If it had no feasible alternatives one could argue 
that the buyer should be liable for the entire $500 million and if instead it could 
seamlessly switch to selling to an alternative customer, the reliance damages would be 
zero.
112
 
In the actual case the market had in fact collapsed; the expected value of the 
contract to the seller had risen, reflecting the change in the market. Here, there are 
damages and their existence has nothing to do with the newness of the business. Damages 
were assessed by dueling experts. The seller’s expert witness concluded that damages 
were $520 million while the buyer’s concluded that there had been no loss at all. The trial 
judge was not impressed by either expert: “I found both experts provided unreliable 
testimony and worse yet, it appeared to be clouded by their obvious advocacy, to 
paraphrase a popular show tune, on behalf of the lady they came in with.”113 But even if 
                                                 
111 2006 WL 147586. This is the trial court decision.  
112 See the discussion of Brundige, Section I. 6. 
113 Trial court, 2006, p. 3. Reconsideration Order. 
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they had done impeccable work, he would not have accepted it; it would have been too 
speculative: 
In order to know what AEP’s revenues would be over the next twenty 
years, one would have to be able to presage a vast and varied body of facts. 
Any projection of lost profits would necessarily include assumptions 
regarding the price of electricity and the costs of operating over twenty 
years. One would also need to surmise what competing forms of energy 
such as coal and nuclear energy would cost over the same time period. 
Also factoring into this calculation are the political and regulatory 
developments over twenty years, population growth in the Entergy region, 
and technological advances affecting the production of power and related 
products. With so many unknown variables, these experts might have done 
as well had they consulted tealeaves or a crystal ball.
114
 
  
So, he concluded, the damages were zero.
115
 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that AEP’s “lost profits” was indeed the 
appropriate damage remedy.
116
 It concluded that while the projection of lost profits 
would be difficult it was not “speculative;” it is, in effect, the same exercise the parties 
engaged in when negotiating the twenty-year contract in the first place. I want to make 
two points. First, neither “speculative” nor “certainty” is helpful in determining whether 
there should be compensation. Is it easier to assess damages in this contract, with a 
twenty-year horizon and with both quantity and price variable, than in any of the ones 
discussed above in which the court first said the new business rule no longer precluded 
recovery, but then denied recovery because the measurement was too uncertain? Courts 
have been content to fall back on “certainty,” using it as a wild card to reward some 
claimants and not others.  
 
Second, in most of the cases discussed above the lost profit claim was for 
consequential damages. In Tractebel, the lost profits claim should be viewed as being for 
direct damages. That is, the contract was an asset for the seller and when the market 
collapsed the value of that asset went up. How much? That is the measure of what the 
seller lost at the time of repudiation. It would be the difference between the expected net 
revenues had the market conditions not changed and the net revenues given that there had 
been a change. That difference is precisely what the experts were attempting to ascertain 
under the lost profit rubric—the net present value of the difference between two projected 
revenue streams.
117
 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In MindGames, Judge Posner rejected the new business rule:     
                                                 
114 Trial court, 2005, p. 11-12. 
115 At 8. 
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 Tractebel Energy Marketing, Inc. v. AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 487 F.3d 89 (2007). 
117 I have elaborated on this in “Reckoning Contract Damages: Valuation of the Contract as an Asset.” 
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The rule doesn't work because it manages to be at once vague and 
arbitrary. One reason is that the facts that it makes determinative, “new,” 
“business,” and “profits,” are not facts, but rather are the conclusions of a 
reasoning process that is based on the rationale for the rule and that as a 
result turns the rule into an implicit standard. What, for example, is a “new” 
business? What, for that matter, is a “business”? And are royalties what 
the rule means by “profits”?118 
 
Courts have fiddled with all these questions to determine whether or not a particular 
claimant should be allowed to recover. Sometimes they will uphold the per se rule but 
then decide that the business is not new.
119
 As we have seen in a number of instances, 
they will find that there is no per se rule, but they will decline to award lost profits for 
various reasons, often invoking certainty. In other cases, courts will claim that certainty is 
needed only to show the existence of lost profits and that there is a lower standard to 
show the magnitude of the loss. Some courts have judged the lost profits measure by an 
even lower standard; recall Judge Peters criterion: does “the size of the verdict so shock 
the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the [trier of fact] was influenced by 
partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.”120 
 
Judge Posner elaborated on his dismissal of the new business rule: “The rule 
could be made sensible by appropriate definition of its terms, but we find it hard to see 
what would be gained, given the existence of the serviceable and familiar standard of 
excessive speculativeness.”121 However, I have argued here that speculativeness, or 
reasonable certainty, is the wrong way to go. The problem is not difficulties in 
measurement. Rather, it is that the courts have often been measuring the wrong thing. In 
cases in which the claim is for a future stream of profits on a project that never got off the 
ground, the presumption should be that there were no lost profits. Any recovery should be 
based on the plaintiff having some assets (either preexisting or acquired in reliance) the 
value of which was contingent on performance of the project. For other cases (royalty 
streams, delay, defect) claimants have suffered a real loss. Whether they should recover 
does not depend on whether they are a new business or the certainty of proof. The Hadley 
rule provides one constraint. Ex ante contract language (liquidated damages, warranty 
disclaimers, remedy limitations) provides another. 
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